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Abstract:  We examine a theory of competitive innovation in which new ideas are
introduced only when diminishing returns to the use of existing ideas sets in. After an
idea is introduced, the knowledge capital associated with that idea expands, and its value
falls. Once the value falls far enough, it becomes profitable to introduce a new idea. The
resulting theory is consistent with fixed costs of innovation and it accounts for the same
facts as existing theories of endogenous growth. However, there is evidence that
innovation frequently takes place even absent monopoly power and that it is driven by
diminishing returns on existing ideas – two facts that the existing theory cannot account
for.
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1. Introduction
The standard view of innovation is that progress takes place along a quality ladder
– driven by the short-term monopoly power innovators acquire at each step, as short-term
monopoly power is essential to compensate for the fixed cost of innovating. For nearly
sixty years, since it was first advanced in Schumpeter [1942], this theory has been the
primary tool accounting for the dependence of technological progress on economic
fundamentals such as patience and cost. This picture of innovation has been used as an
explanation for economic growth in the models of Romer [1990], Grossman and
Helpman [1991], and Aghion and Howitt [1992], among other.
Our own and other researchers examination of innovation
2 suggests that a
different story is worthy of consideration. No doubt, each innovation opens the door to
moving on to a new rung of the quality ladder. However, when innovation is costly, it is
socially, and most often privately, best to exploit the adoption and imitation opportunities
it makes available on the current rung before moving on to the next. Only when these are
exhausted does it becomes socially and privately optimal to introduce a new innovation.
In such a process fixed costs and monopoly power play no essential role.
There are abundant examples to illustrate the different predictions of the two
theories, the most obvious being that in the standard theory absent monopoly power
innovation is impossible, while – as occurs in practice – it is possible in the other case.
More relevant to the quality ladder framework, the standard view predicts that, for
example, after the basic Bessemer process for steelmaking was invented
3, innovators’
attention and resources would be immediately devoted to the basic oxygen steelmaking
process, which instead came around only a century later. Our theory predicts, instead,
that they would, as they did, continue to spend their time and energy improving the
Bessemer process, expanding its usage in the production of steel and, more generally,
exploit its adoption in new profitable venues. Only after the Bessemer process was both
greatly improved and widespread, and the gains to its further improvement and expansion
driven down, would potential innovators move on to work on a completely different
                                                
2 See, for example, our recent book: Boldrin and Levine [2008b] as well as, among the very many others,
Payson Usher [1929], Burn [1961], Mansfield [1986], Bessen and Maskin [1999], Herrera and Schroth
[2003], McClellan and Dorn [2006], Braguinsky et al. [2007].
3 In the late 1850s, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steel and references therein.2
method for steelmaking. The latter is an accurate description of the historical facts
pertaining to the invention of the two methods, as well as of radio and television, steam
power engines, computer processors, aircraft engines and so on – in fact, the history of
R&D shows it is the rule and not the exception. After the successful introduction of a
new product, potential innovators do not turn immediately to inventing something else
that may replace it, but rather to adopting, imitating and possibly improving the recent
invention. After inventing the light bulb, Thomas Edison turned primarily to investing in
and promoting electrical power and selling light bulbs – not to inventing the fluorescent
light or the LED. His would-be competitors did likewise. As every movie producer can
tell you, the time to release your great new blockbuster adventure movie is not a few days
after your rival has done the same.
The theory of competitive innovation is not new. Aside from the classical
theorists – Schumpeter [1912], von Neumann [1937], Plant [1934] and Stigler [1956],
among others – recent important contributions include the unpublished works of Funk
[1996] and Quah [2002], the paper by Hellwig and Irmen [2001], and our own work,
Boldrin and Levine [1997, 2002 and 2008a]. Examples of papers in which competitive
innovation is applied to substantive questions other than endogenous growth are,
Andolfatto and McDonald [1998], Boldrin and Levine [2001], Funk [2008], Hopenhayn
[2006], Jovanovic and McDonald [1994], Prescott and McGrattan [2008]. During the last
twenty years, many other authors have contributed to this body of literature by
investigating various of its aspects, such as the connections between constant returns to
scale and economic growth (Jones and Manuelli [1990], Rebelo [1991]), the link between
the degree of appropriation and competition (Makowski and Ostroy [1995, 2001]), and
the role of indivisibilities in economic development (Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1997]).
The goal of our earlier work was largely to demonstrate the possibility of
competitive innovation by clarifying the role of limited capacity in determining
competitive rents. Our goal in this paper is to advance the theory to empirical relevance
by embodying it in a benchmark growth model that – by capturing the idea that advances
are not desirable until existing opportunities have been exploited – can help account for
the facts of innovation.3
2. The Grossman-Helpman Model
Because the predictions of standard models of endogenous growth are well know,
we use them as a yardstick against which to evaluate those of the model we propose.
There are a variety of models of quality ladders with fixed costs, increasing returns, and
external effects, most notably those of Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpman [1991],
and Aghion and Howitt [1992]. We take as our starting point the one by Grossman and
Helpman [1991] because it leads to a simple closed form solution allowing for a
straightforward welfare analysis. Here we summarize their results, employing their
notation throughout.
Goods come in different qualities.
4 Denote by  J D  the consumption of goods of
qualityJ , let S be the subjective interest rate, and   M   the (constant) increase in quality
as we move one step up the ladder. We let
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One unit of output of each quality requires one unit of labor to obtain. The first
firm to reach step  J  on the quality ladder is awarded a legal monopoly over that
technology. This monopoly lasts only until there is a new innovation and technology
 J   is introduced, at which time all firms have access to technologyJ . Taking labor to
be the numeraire, the implication is that the price of output of technology   J   relative
to that of technology  J  is given by the limit-pricing formula P M  .
The intensity of R&D for a firm is denoted by J , and the probability of
successfully achieving the next step during a period of length DT  is  DT J  at a cost of  ) AD T J  .
Let  %  denote steady state consumer spending. Since the wage rate is numeraire
and price is M the monopolist gets a margin of   M   on each unit sold. His share of %
is therefore his margin divided by the price  	     MM M   . Since the cost of
getting the monopoly is  ) A , the rate of return is   	  ) %A M  . However, there is a
                                                
4 In the original Grossman-Helpman paper there was a continuum of identical sectors indexed byX . Since
this plays little role in the analysis, and for notational simplicity, we omit it here.4
chance  J  of losing the monopoly, reducing the rate of return by this amount. Equating









There is a single unit of labor,
5 the demand for which comes from the  ) A J  units
used in R&D and the   % M units used to produce output, yielding the constraint
 ) A% JM  .
Notice that the same labor is used for R&D as is used to produce output. This captures
the sensible – and in this model crucial – idea that there is an increasing marginal cost of
R&D. That the increasing cost is due to resources being sucked out of the output sector is
analytically convenient. It implies that the cost of R&D, measured in units of output, is
proportional to the current rung on the quality ladder, making possible steady state
analysis.








By contrast the socially optimal research intensity is derived by calculating steady
state utility to be ;LOG LOG   	LOG = % MJ S M S  . Since the optimal plan in a steady










3. Climbing the Ladder under Competition
Innovation is driven by the rush of firms to get ahead of one another, suggesting
that competition is the driving force. In the story just summarized, the reward from
competing is some temporary monopoly power. We want to tell an alternative story in
which the incentives for innovating come about because of diminishing returns to making
use of previous inventions, and in which the reward from competing is a higher return on
capital. Because inventing a new good costs more than reproducing an existing one, it
                                                
5 We have simplified Grossman and Helpman notation by normalizing the stock of labor to one.5
becomes profitable to invent the new good only when the available quantity of the old
good is large enough to make its price low, relative to that of the new one.
Before presenting a model of endogenous innovation due to diminishing returns,
it is useful to look at a typical example of how real quality ladders work, borrowed from
Irwin and Klenow [1994]. The good in question is the DRAM memory chip. The
different qualities correspond to the capacity of a single chip. Figure 1, showing
shipments of different quality chips, is reproduced from that paper. The key fact is that
production of a particular quality does not jump up instantaneously but ramps up
gradually, and that a new quality is introduced when the stock of the old one is fairly
large. Further, the old vintage is phased out gradually as the new one is introduced. Their
price data shows that the price of each vintage of chip falls roughly exponentially over
the product cycle – meaning that the incentive to introduce the next generation chip keeps
increasing. This vividly portrays our story. Evidence suggests this is the usual pattern in
Figure 1: DRAM Vintages6
most industries.
6 The question this evidence poses, and the intuition upon which our
model is built is: why introduce a new product if the old one is still doing so well?
4. Innovation with Knowledge Capital
We adopt the same demand structure as Grossman and Helpman, hence quality
adjusted consumption is
J
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Unlike Grossman and Helpman, we assume that consumption is produced both
from labor and the existing stock of specialized productive capacity. For simplicity we
identify “productive capacity” with knowledge and assume that different rungs on the
quality ladder correspond to different qualities of capital and knowledge used to produce
that particular consumption good. We denote by  J K  the combined stock of capital and
embedded knowledge that goes into producing quality  J  output. By explicitly modeling
the stock of knowledge, we can distinguish between investment on a given rung –
spreading and adopting knowledge of a given type through teaching, learning, imitation,
and copying – and investment that moves between rungs – innovation or the creation of
new knowledge. We refer to  J K  as quality J  knowledge capital or, simply, knowledge. In
practice this can have many forms – it can be in the form of human knowledge or human
capital, but it can also be embodied in physical forms such as books, or factories and
machines with the appropriate design. In our theory it plays the crucial role of keeping
track of progress on a particular rung of the quality ladder.
Knowledge has two uses: it can be used either to generate more knowledge or to
produce consumption. More knowledge is produced either by increasing the stock of the
same quality of knowledge capital or by creating a higher quality. If quality J  knowledge
is used to produce more knowledge of the same quality, it does so at a fixed rate B S 
                                                
6 See, for example, Hannan and McDowell [1987], Manuelli and Seshadri [2003], Rose and Joskow [1990],
Sarkar [1998]. This is closely related to the S-shaped diffusion curve for new products that – since the early
work of Rogers [1962] – is widely accepted as a stylized fact; see Jovanovic and Lach [1989], for a recent
economic model.7
per unit of input. In other words the production function for existing knowledge is linear
in the knowledge capital used as input. This can be regarded as capital widening or
accumulation and/or competitive imitation.
7
More knowledge can also be created through innovation – that is, the production
of a higher quality of knowledge capital from an existing quality. This can be regarded as
capital deepening. Specifically, a unit of knowledge capital of quality   J   can be
produced from A M   units of qualityJ . In the strict interpretation of  J K  as a stock of
knowledge about how to produce, capital widening corresponds to the spread of existing
knowledge, and capital deepening to the creation of new knowledge from old.
8
Alternatively, knowledge capital of quality  J  can be employed in the production
of quality  J  consumption on a one-to-one basis. The production of consumption also
requires labor – leading here to diminishing returns for each quality of knowledge capital.
Note that it is the diminishing returns on each rung of the ladder that is crucial to our
story: the specific details of diminishing returns arising from a labor constraint are used
for analytical convenience. Specifically, each unit of quality  J  knowledge capital
employed in the consumption sector requires also a unit of labor to produce a unit flow of
quality  J  consumption. Our key assumption is that measured in units of current
consumption the creation of new knowledge is costlier than spreading knowledge already
in existence, that is   BA M   This implies that as long as it is not needed for expanding
consumption – that is, until all labor is employed with the most advanced quality of
knowledge capital – it is not socially efficient to introduce a higher quality of knowledge
in the production of consumption. We also normalize the fixed labor supply to one.
                                                
7 As before, the assumption of linearity is purely for algebraic convenience: any sufficiently productive
concave function would also do and, in fact, enrich the model from an applied perspective.
8 Notice that new knowledge capital loses the capability of the old knowledge capital that was converted.
This may be true for the physical replacement of machines with newer models, but is not usually the case
for human capital – a pilot may still be capable of flying a Cessna after learning to fly a Boeing 777.
However, the key constraint is that at any moment in time you must be acting as one of the two kinds of
pilot, but not as both. If we introduced a technology for converting quality   J   knowledge capital back to
quality  J  at the same ratio as the forward conversion, then this would precisely capture knowledge that was
not lost, but knowledge capital as a resource that could be deployed at only one level at a time. However, in
the case we study, there is no reason to use the backward conversion technology, so the equilibrium would
not change. Should there be a indivisibility in the deepening technology, the possibility of such a backward
conversion would effectively eliminate the indivisibility: just produce enough of the new knowledge to
overcome the indivisibility, then convert the excess back to the old knowledge. This may help explain why,
in practice, indivisibilities do not seem to be an important practical problem for the bulk of innovation.8
Let  Å ÅANDÅ WD C
JJ J KK K  denote, respectively, the investment of knowledge capital of
quality  J  used in the production of (i) knowledge capital of quality J  (widening), (ii)
knowledge capital of quality   J   (deepening), and, (iii) final consumption of quality J .
At every point in time, the resource constraint is
￿￿ ￿ ￿
WDC
JT JT JT JT KKKK  ,
where the right hand side variables are all non negative and one or more of them may be
chosen to be zero. As time is continuous, we omit the time subscript when not strictly
needed.









   .
Recall that  C
JJ KD   units of the stock of knowledge must be allocated to the
consumption sector. Note that, over a short period of time, there is no limit on the flow of
quality  J  knowledge into quality  J  , that is  D
J K  may be arbitrarily large, provided  J K   is
correspondingly negative, so we allow also discrete conversion  ￿  JJ KK A ￿ %  % .
The key technical fact is that this economy is an ordinary diminishing return
economy with three sectors: widening, deepening and consumption. Competitive
equilibrium can be described in the usual way as the combination of consumer
optimization and profit maximization. The first and second welfare theorems hold, so
efficient allocations can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium and vice versa.
9
5. Competitive Equilibrium with Knowledge Capital
Our primary goal is to characterize the competitive equilibrium of the model – or
equivalently the solution to the planner problem. We will examine the robustness of the
equilibrium to the main assumptions later. For the sake of the reader, we summarize here
our three parametric assumptions and the purposes they serve: (i)
                                                
9 The welfare theorems are proven for the discrete time version of this model by Boldrin and Levine
[2002]. In that paper we assumed that one unit of capital of type  J and  J M￿  units of labor were required to
produce a unit of quality  J  consumption, and that the capital is used up in the process of producing
consumption. This simply changes the units in which knowledge capital is measured. The assumptions here
are chosen for compatibility with Grossman and Helpman [1991].9
ÅMAKESÅDEEPENINGÅCOSTLY A M   (ii)  ÅMAKESÅWIDENINGÅPROFITABLE B S   (iii)
 ÅMAKESÅDEEPENINGÅCOSTLIERÅTHANÅWIDENING BA M 
Under these assumptions we will show that, as the stock of knowledge capital
grows, after a possible initial unemployment phase where there is too little knowledge to
employ the entire stock of labor, the competitive equilibrium settles into a recurring
cycle.
The cycle alternates between a growth phase (widening) in which consumption
grows at the rate B S   by upgrading the stock of knowledge used to produce it, and a
build-up phase (deepening) in which consumption remains flat while a new quality of
knowledge capital is accumulated. The growth phase ends when it is no longer possible
to increase consumption without innovation - that is when all labor is applied to the most
advanced type of knowledge capital, say qualityJ . This behavior of consumption is
illustrated (for the case      BA MS  ) in Figure 2
10, where the blue
                                                
10 Thanks to Alexander Monge Naranjo for producing Figures 2 and 3 while discussing this paper at the
Economic Development Conference, NYU-Stern, March 2009.10
line describes aggregate consumption and the green dashed, red and blue dotted lines
portray, respectively, the time paths of  ￿￿  ÅANDÅ  JJ J CC C ￿￿
To understand how innovation takes place – that is, knowledge capital of quality
 J   is first created, then progressively accumulated and applied to the production of
consumption by replacing knowledge capital of quality  J  – the key idea is that the
relative value of quality  J  and   J   knowledge capital simultaneously used in
producing consumption is M, while the instantaneous price ratio, when the innovation
first occurs, must be A M  . This has an important implication. Because  A M  , at the
first moment that the switchover from quality   J   to quality  J  knowledge capital is
complete, using knowledge capital of quality   J   to replace knowledge capital of
quality J  in the production of consumption would yield negative profits. A positive
amount of time – the “build up phase” – must elapse between the exhaustion of the   J 
technology and the use of knowledge capital of quality   J   to produce consumption.
During this build up phase the new type of knowledge is accumulated and its price drops
until it becomes cheap enough to use it in the production of consumption. This begins the11
next growth phase, which must therefore begin a discrete amount of time after the end of
the previous one.
11
This behavior of knowledge capital is illustrated (again for the case
    BA MS  ) in Figure 3, where the blue line, the green dashed
and red lines portray, respectively, the time paths of  ￿￿  ÅANDÅ  JJ J KK K ￿￿ The reader should
note especially the jumps in the level of old and new capital stock at the time of
innovation, which are carefully discussed later and constitute a key prediction of our
model.
A useful measure of the rate of technological progress is research intensity. In this
setting it is measured by the inverse of the combined length  ￿ U  of the two phases. We










so that it is increasing with B  the rate of capital widening, and decreasing with the
subjective interest rate S and the cost of knowledge creation A .
The Pricing of Knowledge Capital
In the next three propositions we wish to characterize the competitive equilibrium
– or equivalently the solution to the planner problem. The Lagrange multipliers
supporting the optimal quantities are of course the competitive equilibrium prices; it turns
out to be more convenient to solve the model in terms of prices instead of quantities.
These prices satisfy the two key competitive properties: they support household
consumption and yield zero profits. We exploit these two properties, and the model’s
linearity, to solve it analytically.
The key to understanding the competitive equilibrium is the pricing of knowledge
capital. It is convenient not to take labor as numeraire, but rather use current utility to that
purpose. This implies that the current price of consumption is marginal utility; in our
logarithmic case equal to  T C . Define  JT Q  to be the time T  price of quality  J  knowledge
capital. We first examine the value of knowledge in the production of more knowledge.
                                                
11 We are grateful to V.V. Chari for forcing us to clarify the intuitive reason why the build up phase must
have a strictly positive length.12
One use of knowledge is for deepening – that is to innovate by creating higher
quality knowledge capital. Zero profits on deepening implies that  ￿￿  J TJ T QA Q ￿ b , that
is:  ￿￿  J TJ T QQ A ￿   at the time of innovation. Knowledge can also be used for widening –
that is to create more knowledge of the same quality. In this case the physical rate of
return is the growth rate B , so we must have this return plus capital gains equal to the
subjective interest rate, that is,   JTJ T BQQ S   , or equivalently for zero profits on
widening   	  JTJ T QQ BS     .
12
That the price of knowledge is necessarily falling over time is significant.
Consider, for example, the fact that the first mover must incur greater costs than
subsequent competitors. This is true here, since, to produce quality   J   from quality  J ,
the first innovator must pay more than subsequent imitators for knowledge as an input.
However: by virtue of being first, he can also sell his freshly created knowledge for a
higher price than his imitators, who must sell at a later date when the new knowledge is
worth less. In other words, even in this model of perfect competition, there is a first
mover advantage, because the competitive price of knowledge capital falls after it is first
created. It is this first mover advantage that motivates innovators to act while knowing
they will soon be imitated.
Consumption Value of Knowledge Capital: The Initial Unemployment Phase
Next we turn to the value and price of knowledge used to produce consumption.
When the economy begins, the initial condition may be such that there is insufficient
knowledge capital to employ all the labor. We first examine the value of knowledge used
to produce consumption during this phase. Recall that, when they are both used in
producing consumption, the relative value of quality  J  and   J   knowledge is M, while
at the time the second is first created their price ratio must be A M  . This implies that,
when there is no full employment, only the lowest quality of knowledge is used to
produce consumption. Subsequently we will establish that when there is full employment,
no more than two qualities of knowledge capital are used to produce consumption.
                                                
12 Strictly speaking, these conditions need only hold with inequality if knowledge capital is not being used
to produce more knowledge capital. For example, if there is no capital of quality *  or higher, then we can
have  ￿￿ JT J T QA Q ￿   for   J* p. However, there exist equivalent equilibria in which profits are zero. See
Boldrin and Levine [2002] for the technical details.13
What is the value of knowledge capital used to produce consumption when there
is unemployment? We can determine this from the fact that consumption and the
knowledge capital producing it are perfect substitutes: both can and are produced from
the current stock of knowledge.
13
Proposition 1: Depending on initial conditions, there may be an initial unemployment
phase during which the single lowest quality of knowledge,J , is used to produce
consumption. The price of knowledge capital is   J
JTJ T T QV B C M  . Consumption grows
at the constant rate   TT CC B S   .  The unemployment phase ends when  J
T C M  .
Proof: Consider how we might use a small amount F of quality  J  knowledge over a
short period of time U  to produce either consumption or more knowledge of quality  J . If
consumption is to be produced, F units of quality  J  knowledge yield  J MF U units of
consumption. If quality  J  knowledge is to be produced the yield is BFU  new units. Hence
one unit of quality  J  knowledge is a perfect substitute for   J B M  units of consumption.
Since the marginal social value of  T C  units of quality adjusted consumption is
 T C , we can conclude that, when there is unemployment, the marginal social value in
producing consumption of a unit of quality  J  knowledge is   J
JTT VB C M w . Its price
cannot be less than this: we must have  JTJ T QV p , with equality if knowledge of that
quality is actually used to produce consumption. As claimed, if quality   J  knowledge
capital is used to produce consumption, then no higher quality can be used. That is, if
quality   JJ   was used to produce consumption, then we would have
￿
￿￿  JJ
JTJ T J TJ T QQ VV M ￿  . But, because knowledge capital of quality  J  can be readily
obtained from that of quality   J  by applying the innovation technology for   JJ   times,
the latter equality would contradict the condition for zero profit on deepening,
￿
￿  JJ
JTJ T QQ A ￿  .
We have shown that during the initial unemployment phase a single quality of
knowledge, J , is used to produce consumption, the lowest available quality. The price of
this knowledge capital is   J
JTJ T T QV B C M  . Since the condition for no profit on
widening is   	 JTJ T QQ BS    , it must be that consumption grows at the constant rate
 TT CC B S   . Eventually, the stock of knowledge of quality  J  grows sufficiently large
that a quantity of consumption  J
T C M   can be produced, meaning that we have reached
                                                
13 By assumption the labor constraint is not binding during the unemployment phase.14
full employment and it is no longer possible to increase output by employing more
quality J  knowledge.
;
Consumption Value of Knowledge Capital: Full Employment
We next examine the value of knowledge capital used to produce consumption
when there is full employment. Suppose that quality   JJ   knowledge is used to
produce consumption. In this case, consumption may be increased by replacing some of
the inferior quality   J  knowledge capital with additional units of quality  J  knowledge,
which has, therefore, value in producing consumption. Notice that, instead, the lowest
quality knowledge used in producing consumption has no marginal value there:
additional units cannot increase consumption at all.
We follow the same analysis as in the initial unemployment phase: we determine
a price ratio between consumption and quality  J  knowledge capital by examining how
much of each we can produce from a given small amount F of quality  J  knowledge over
a short period of time U . The key difference is that with full employment when we move
quality  J  knowledge into the consumption sector, we must displace some lower quality
 J  knowledge in order to free up the labor needed to work with the newly added quality
J  knowledge.
14 This frees the displaced   J  knowledge, which, of course, has social
value.
Proposition 2: During full employment no more than two qualities of knowledge capital
are actually used to produce consumption, and these must be consecutive qualities. If   J


















with equality if J  is also used to produce consumption. If two qualities are both used in
positive amounts in producing consumption the latter grows at the rate B S  .
Proof: In Appendix 1.
                                                
14 This is often labeled “creative destruction”: a more productive technology replaces a less productive one
through the scrapping of the latter and the shifting of workers from old plants to new ones. In practice, this
often involves replacing firms using the old quality capital with firms that have adopted the new one.15
The Growth Cycle
We are now in a position to analyze what happens at the end of the initial
unemployment phase when employment is full. Because, after this initial phase, the
optimal program implies there is always full employment, the forthcoming analysis
applies to all subsequent periods. That is, possibly after an initial unemployment phase,
the economy cycles between growth phases - during which consumption grows at the
constant rate B S   - and build-up phases - where consumption remains constant. After
each complete cycle, it repeats at the next level of the quality ladder.
Proposition 3: Consumption remains constant during a build-up phase that lasts for



































Proof: In Appendix I.
6. Comparison of the Models, and Some Data
We have, now, three possible models explaining endogenous growth. One is the


















Finally, we have our model of competitive knowledge capital accumulation, in which the









Each model is designed to get a closed form solution. Qualitatively, each is a
similar function of the cost of innovating and the degree of impatience. As consumers are
more patient, the frequency of innovation goes up. As it becomes more costly to
innovate, innovation goes down. There are of course minor differences in the functional
forms between these solutions. But the functional forms depend on a variety of
assumptions – logarithmic utility, exponentially improving steps, and so forth – that were
contrived to make the models easy to solve, so the particular functional forms have no
strong claim of correctness. Moreover, the models differ in ways that are designed to ease
the solution in each case.
What are then the substantive, as opposed to the technically convenient,
differences? First, the parameterM, how high each rung of the ladder is, has no effect in
our model – this is due to the presence of two offsetting effects, increasing the intensity
of innovation during the first build-up phase of the cycle and decreasing it during the
second growth phase. However, this “neutrality” of step size in our model is due to the
simplifications involved, and it is likely that various adjustments could yield either
increasing innovation in step-size as in Grossman-Helpman, or decreasing innovation in
step-size.
Second, the competitive innovation model has the extra parameter b , representing
the rate at which productive capacity increases or is turned into usable output, possibly
through imitation. As it becomes easier to reproduce knowledge capital, in the sense that
B  is larger, the intensity of innovation increases. In a loose sense the Grossman-Helpman
model, like all models in which knowledge is a public good, assumes that B d. This
is because once the fixed cost is paid and a new rung has been introduced anyone can
make an infinite number of copies of the  j th good. A finite number of copies are17
produced only because the monopoly power of the first innovator is used to prevent
additional entry. Put it differently, the standard model assumes that the movement from
one particular vintage to the next can be infinitely rapid (once discovered, knowledge is a
public good everyone can use); the presence of a fixed cost at each step explains why
things do not go haywire.
Finally, the model of competitive knowledge capital accumulation has a
distinctive implication for the growth of output: it should grow in bursts (the growth
phase) punctuated by periods in which output does not grow (the build-up phase).
Moreover, the build-up phase should end when a new vintage of consumption is
produced for the first time. Notice first that, per-se, the fact that the build-up phase has a
positive length is not essential to our theory: when A M   we have that   B U   and the
new knowledge is used to produce consumption right away. Still, as long as   BA M 
meaning that innovation is costlier than imitation, the former takes place only when all
labor is employed with the latest available quality of knowledge. Further, the growth
process still alternates between widening and deepening even if the latter is instantaneous
and consumption grows at a constant balanced rate, as in most growth models. In this
special case, our model “endogenizes” Solow’s growth model of vintage capital with
exogenous TFP growth.
Turning to the DRAM data from Irwin and Klenow [1994] we find that new
vintages in fact trickle into production which is at variance with the model. This is not
terribly surprising, as in practice even during the buildup phase there will be some
demand for larger capacity chips for specialty use, and some chips produced for test
purposes and subsequently sold for specialty use.
So let us take as our operational definition of “produced for the first time” the first
time the new generation constitutes 5% of the total market for memory. We can then
examine aggregate output of memory (that is measured in bytes, not chips) and plot this
against the dates at which new generations of chips are introduced.
The Figure 4 shows this aggregate memory output as the blue curve, with the
dates at which new generations are introduced as vertical red lines. The data does not
show that every slowdown is followed by a switchover, nor even that every switchover is
preceded by a slowdown (the 1984 switchover clearly is not), but rather that, in general,
there are period of growth alternating with slowdowns. Remarkably these slowdowns18
have essentially zero growth as the theory predicts, and they are clearly associated with
the switchovers. The ratio between the growth and buildup phases in the data is
interesting too, as the buildup phases are very short, suggesting that M is not much
smaller than A.
7. Fixed Cost of Knowledge Capital
A key feature of this model is the build-up phase during which consumption is
flat, and capital is accumulated for the “big push” to the next level of knowledge capital.
Because the exact time at which conversion between qualities of knowledge capital takes
place is indeterminate, we will focus on the equilibrium in which conversion does not
take place until the new type of knowledge is needed – at the end of the build-up – at
which time all current knowledge capital not needed for producing consumption is
converted to the new level. In Appendix 2 we show that, in this equilibrium, the amount
of current knowledge capital that will be converted is exactly

























What does such an equilibrium look like to an observer of the economy? She will
notice that knowledge capital of the current type is cumulated beyond the amount needed
to produce consumption until one day a new product is released, and a discrete
investment is made, converting  
 &  units of old knowledge capital to new knowledge
capital. Such an observer might be forgiven for suspecting that this is evidence of
increasing returns to scale, a fixed cost in the production of knowledge, or an
indivisibility in the production of knowledge. Is this inference warranted? Not
necessarily: our model is one of purely diminishing returns to scale, and there are
equilibria that exhibit exactly this behavior.
On the other hand, it is certainly plausible to argue that there is such a fixed cost.
Suppose that there is indeed a fixed cost of introducing new knowledge capital for the
first time. Specifically, to produce for the first time quality   J   knowledge from quality
J   requires a fixed cost of &  units of quality  J  knowledge. This results in the creation of
K&   initial units of quality   J   knowledge.
15 For computational simplicity and
notational convenience, once the fixed cost is incurred, we assume that it is possible to
convert additional units of qualityJ  knowledge to quality   J   knowledge at the same
rate   &K A  . This may seem a strong assumption – it might seem plausible that, after
knowledge of a given quality is first converted to new knowledge capital, the cost of
converting additional old knowledge capital will fall. It will become clear later that,
properly modeled, such an assumption adds complication to the model, without changing
the essential results.
The key observation is a simple one: if  
 && b  – that is to say, if the
indivisibility or fixed cost is not too large, then the presence of a competitive equilibrium
is consistent with the presence of the fixed cost.  Note that this is not a result of
smoothing over a continuum of consumers as is the case with consumption
                                                
15 As discussed in footnote 7, if it is possible to convert new knowledge capital to old at the same ratio as
forward conversion, then fixed cost does not matter, as it can be “undone” by a subsequent backward
conversion. This may partially explain why, when we consider the empirics of fixed costs, they do not
seem to matter a great deal: most electrical engineers, if not most economists, can still change a light bulb
by themselves.20
indivisibilities: this is purely due to the way in which equilibrium production is arranged.
Competitive equilibrium in the ordinary sense exists in the presence of a fixed cost.
On the other hand if  
 &&   then competitive equilibrium in the usual sense
does not exist. There will be moments of time in which at competitive equilibrium prices
it appears profitable to incur the fixed cost, while if it is actually incurred, prices will
drop so much as to make it in fact unprofitable. This may be thought of as the classical
case, the one increasing returns theorists have in mind.
8. Robustness
We have developed a model based on a number of special assumptions designed
for ease of exposition and solution. We now verify that the basic conclusions are not
sensitive to the special assumptions.
Features of the innovation process
First is the fact that when new knowledge capital is created from old, less of the
new knowledge capital is made available. In other words, an additional unit of new
knowledge requires more than one unit of the old knowledge. This is a natural
assumption: the stock of knowledge capital is measured by the amount of labor it can
employ and any process of “upgrading” – be it of machines, humans, or both – will entail
the destruction of some previous employment capacity. This is, after all, what the popular
expression “creative destruction” is meant to capture.
Second, there is an aspect of the conversion technology that may strike the reader
as unrealistic: the conversion takes place instantly – while in fact the development of new
knowledge generally takes time. This however turns out to be a matter of convenience
rather than substance. Suppose that A units of quality  J  knowledge capital converted at
time T  do not become available as a unit of quality   J   knowledge capital until time
T %. Since the model is one of perfect foresight, the need for conversion can be
foreseen, so if we imagine the conversion taking place at time T % then the A units of
quality  J  knowledge capital not being used to produce consumption would have grown
to  B AE %. Hence if we consider a model with no delay but cost of conversion   B AA E %  ,
this is equivalent to the model with delay and cost of conversion A. In effect, all we have
done is to assume that any time delay is capitalized into the cost of conversion.21
Labor Cost of Producing Knowledge
We have assumed that labor is not an input into the knowledge creation process.
On the one hand, we doubt that the type of labor used in knowledge creation is a
particularly good substitute for the labor used to produce output, so we do not view the
alternative assumption as especially realistic either. On the other hand: what happens if
we require some sort of labor or other input into the knowledge creation process? In the
divisible case, it does not matter: the welfare theorems hold regardless of the details of
the production process. In the fixed cost case, this creates an additional incentive to
innovate gradually so as to avoid dragging labor out of the production of consumption all
at once. Still, the sensible model would be one in which new knowledge accumulates
gradually, but is not useful until a threshold is crossed. That is, the right place to put the
constraint is in K  and not in & . This just means that knowledge capital is not employed
in producing output until after K  units are acquired – either way, our analysis would not
change in an important way.
Spillover Externalities
With a spillover externality the producer of knowledge capital does not own all
the knowledge capital that he produces: some of it spills over onto other traders who get
it for “free.” In the extreme it all spills over, and the original producer gets nothing, but
this is not a terribly interesting model. In practice the original innovator gets some share
of the knowledge capital produced, share which may be larger or smaller depending on
circumstances: no doubt in practice there is always some spillover. This will delay
innovation even in the perfectly divisible case, as the innovator will receive only a
portion of the marginal social benefit of his innovation rather than all of it. The resulting
equilibrium will not be first best of course; however, innovation will still take place, it
will simply take longer before the price of inputs drops sufficiently to make it profitable
to innovate.
Cost of Converting Old Knowledge
We have assumed that after the initial fixed cost is paid the cost of converting
further units of old knowledge into new ones remains unchanged. If we assume that the
cost of conversion drops discretely after the initial unit of knowledge capital is produced,22
this is equivalent to a 100% spillover externality and no innovation will take place.
However, that assumption makes little economic sense. We can distinguish two
techniques for learning how to convert old knowledge into new: learning from scratch,
and being taught. The former does not get easier just because somebody already did it.
The latter requires the new knowledge as input. This suggests that the correct model is
one with an additional activity: one that uses new knowledge to convert old knowledge to
new. Consider first the divisible case. Intuitively the social optimum is to create a small
amount of new knowledge using the learning from scratch technique, then switch over to
the conversion activity. Firms that do this are called research universities. The key point
is that, in this case as in our simpler model, it is not socially optimal to create an
infinitesimal amount of new knowledge from scratch and then switch over right away.
This would provide very little capacity for conversion. Rather there is some threshold in
the amount of learning by scratch that is desirable before switching. This, then, is similar
to our earlier analysis: the divisible case satisfies the welfare theorems as it simply has an
additional activity. Since the divisible equilibrium involves accumulating a decent
amount of knowledge using the “from scratch” activity before switching to the
“conversion” activity, an indivisibility requiring a certain amount of “from scratch”
learning need not bind.
16
9. Conclusion
We give an account of endogenous growth and innovation in a world of purely
decreasing returns. In our account competitive pressure and first mover advantage are at
center stage. Although this economy is completely classical, satisfying the first and
second welfare theorems, it never-the-less exhibits an endogenous rate of innovative
activity. Innovation takes place in waves separated by pauses during which knowledge is
accumulated for the next wave. In short, our economy displays endogenous innovation
cycles around a long run trend.
Also, despite the fact that we study an economy with perfect divisibility and
constant returns, to an external observer the sudden introduction of substantial amounts
of new knowledge would suggest that there are fixed costs or increasing returns.
                                                
16 The interested reader should consult Boldrin and Levine [2009b], where a model of discovery with
exactly these properties is developed and analyzed.23
Strikingly, this lumpy introduction of new knowledge implies that the equilibrium we
study is robust with respect to the introduction of a technological indivisibility or a fixed
cost, at least as long as the latter is not particularly large.
Finally: the model has implications for the controversial question of intellectual
property. The conventional wisdom is that intellectual property is needed to encourage
innovation, and that it is worth suffering the monopoly and social distortions from a
modest level of protection. In this world that cannot be the case: since the equilibrium is
first best, the monopoly and social distortions from intellectual property serve only to
reduce the efficiency of the competitive innovation process.
Appendix 1: Propositions 2 and 3
Proposition 2: During full employment no more than two qualities of knowledge capital
are actually used to produce consumption, and these must be consecutive qualities. If   J


















with equality if J  is also used to produce consumption. If two qualities are both used in
positive amounts in producing consumption the latter grows at the rate B S  .
Proof: The easiest way to do the computation is to imagine that newly freed quality   J
knowledge is converted immediately to qualityJ . Consequently, to add one unit of
quality J  knowledge to the production of consumption requires drawing less than one
unit of quality  J  knowledge away from other uses.
Specifically, increasing the quantity of quality J  knowledge used in the
production of consumption by  ￿   	 JJ A F ￿   displaces the identical amount of quality
 J  knowledge. These  ￿   	 JJ A F ￿   free units of quality   J  knowledge convert to
￿￿    	 JJ JJ AA F ￿￿ q
units of quality  J  knowledge. The net input of quality  J  knowledge needed to increase
the amount used in consumption by  ￿   	 JJ A F ￿   is the difference between the total
requirement  ￿   	 JJ A F ￿   and this extra quality  J  knowledge generated from freed
knowledge   J  capital24
￿￿ ￿

    JJ JJ JJ AA A
FF
F ￿￿ ￿ 

.
In other words, if we move F units of quality  J  knowledge to displace quality   J  in the
production of consumption, the amount of quality  J  knowledge used in producing
consumption increases by the greater amount  ￿   	 JJ A F ￿  . Another way of seeing
this is: investing F additional units of quality  J  knowledge capital in the production of
consumption allows to shift  ￿   	 JJ A F ￿  units of labor away from quality   J  and
toward quality  J , the total installed capacity of which increases by  ￿   	 JJ A F ￿  .
We conclude that, over a short period of time U , using an additional F units of
quality  J  knowledge capital to displace the inferior quality   J  in the production of







MM U ￿ 

,
where  ￿ JJ MM   is the productivity differential, measured in consumption units, between
the high and low quality knowledge.
Turning next to the use of knowledge in reproducing itself, as was the case in the
initial unemployment phase, if quality  J  knowledge capital is used to reproduce itself, it
yields BFU  new units.
Putting together the two uses of knowledge in the full employment case, we
conclude that one unit of J  knowledge capital is a perfect substitute for
￿







units of consumption, when knowledge of type   J  is also used to produce consumption.
This gives the marginal social value of a unit of quality  J  knowledge in producing


















The price  JT Q  of quality  J  knowledge capital cannot be lower than 
￿ J
JT V , since it
cannot be strictly profitable to buy knowledge of type  J  and shift it into the production of
consumption. So if   J  is used to produce consumption25
￿ J
JT JT QV p ,
with equality if  J  is also used to produce consumption.
Let us now show that only two qualities of knowledge capital are actually used to
produce consumption and, when this is the case, consumption grows at the rate B S  .
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Now suppose that quality   J  and quality   JJ   are both used to produce
consumption. Then 
￿ J
JT JT QV  . Zero profits on deepening implies  ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿
JJ




￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
J
J T JT QV ￿ ￿ p , we have
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
JJ J JJ JJ JJ
J TJ TJT JT JT AV AQ Q V AV ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ b   ,
the last step following from the inequality above. This contradiction establishes that if   J
is used to produce consumption, then no higher quality than   J   may be used.  In other
words, at most two adjacent qualities of knowledge capital are used to produce
consumption at any given point in time. When this is the case, we must have, for quality
J , the price 
￿ J
JT JT QV
￿  . In particular, 
￿￿   	
JJ
JTJ T JT JT VV Q Q B S
￿￿      . Plugging in for
￿ J
JT V
￿  this implies once again that consumption grows at B S  .
;
Proposition 3: Consumption remains constant during a build-up phase that lasts for



































Proof: We may assume without loss of generality that the initial quality used is   J  . If
the unemployment phase ends at T , then   T C  . The price is  ￿￿  TT QV B  , from
which we can see that the price of quality   J   knowledge is  ￿  T QA B   at the time it is













That is, right when it is first produced, it does not pay to use quality   J   knowledge to
produce consumption. It follows that consumption must now remain constant for some
time; as long as consumption remains constant, so does the value of knowledge of quality
 J   in producing it,  ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ TT VV U ￿  . On the other hand, the price of quality   J 
knowledge capital is falling as it accumulates over time, so that, at T U   it is
￿￿
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it becomes profitable to introduce quality   J  knowledge into producing consumption,
and consumption then grows at the rate B S  .
In general, when quality  J  knowledge capital is first created quality adjusted
consumption is  ￿ J M ￿  and further increases require quality  J  to be used in its production
until consumption reaches  J M . During the growth phase, qualities   J   and  J  are used,
and consumption grows at B S  . Hence the length of the growth phase  G U  is
characterized by










Applying to the general case the argument developed earlier for qualities   J 
and   J  , we see that, at the end of the  J -th growth phase, the price of quality   J 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implying, again, that  ￿￿ ￿￿
J
J T JT VQ ￿ ￿  . In other words, at the end of each growth phase, we
must have a build-up phase, during which consumption remains fixed at  J M , while the
price of quality   J   knowledge (which is being accumulated) falls by a factor of  A M .
Since it falls at the constant rate B S  , this takes









Following this, we again begin the growth phase, and the cycle repeats at the next level of
the quality ladder.
The total length of the cycle  ￿ U  follows from adding  G B UU  , and the research
intensity – the rate at which we move up the ladder – is by definition is just the inverse of
the cycle length.
;
Appendix 2: Capital Levels
Consider a growth phase beginning at time 0. Suppose that initial knowledge
capital used in consumption is entirely of quality  J , and that there are  ￿ J K  units of that
quality. Suppose that consumption starts at  ￿ C , possibly through an initial jump. It will be
convenient to define this jump as  ￿￿  J C YM  , with  ￿  YM  . At time T  consumption
has grown to  ￿￿
￿
B T
T CC E S ￿   until it reaches  ￿ J M ￿  ending the growth phase at time28









During this time we assume that quality  J  knowledge capital is converted to quality

























































































































until G U .
The build-up phase comes next and lasts until  G B T UU  , at which time quality   J 
knowledge is  	
 ￿￿￿ ￿ 
B
G B
JT J KE K U
U ￿￿   . Since  LOG  	 G B AB UU S   , we have,
from above, that
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of the form  ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
BTB T
JT KA A E A E S ￿
￿   . By differentiating
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Plugging back into our guessed solution  ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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Recall that the growth phase lasts for
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which is strictly positive.
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